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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS PPJDEAUX, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020814-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Prideaux was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel at trial? A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of 
law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, "ineffective 
assistance of counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the 
ultimate legal question of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mark Douglas Prideaux appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of 
the Third District Court after he was convicted by a jury of criminal homicide murder, a 
first degree felony; and purchase, transfer, possession or use of a firearm by restricted 
person, a second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On March 27, 2001 Prideaux was charged with one count of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder, a First Degree Felony and one count of Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of 
a Firearm by Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony (R. at 1-3). On July 26, 2001, 
preliminary hearing was held, after which all counts of the case were bound over (R. 49 
and 50). Prideaux was also arraigned on the same date and entered not guilty pleas to 
both charges (R. 49 and 50). 
On August 17, 2001, Prideaux waived his speedy trial rights (R. 52). A four day 
jury trial was held on August 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th of 2002, at the conclusion of which and 
after almost three (3) hours of deliberation the jury rendered a verdict of guilty on both 
counts. The jury also found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was committed 
with a firearm (R. 266 and 267). 
On September 27, 2002, Prideaux was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a 
term of not less than five years and which may be for life for Criminal Homicide Murder, 
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a First Degree Felony, and an indeterminate term of not less than one year and no more 
than fifteen years for Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by Restricted 
Person, a Second Degree Felony, with the sentences to run consecutively with each other 
and with the sentence Prideaux was then serving, and with no credit granted for time 
served (R. 299-301). The order of judgment, sentence and commitment was filed on 
September 27, 2002 (R. 299-301). 
On the 7th of October, 2002, Prideaux filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 303 and 304). 
On November 15, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 332). On October 28, 2002 Prideaux 
motioned for a recommendation of application of credit for time served which was denied 
by the Court on the 14th day of November, 2002 (R. 317, 318, 329-330). 
On July 3, 2002, Prideaux motioned the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 23b 
for remand hearing regarding his claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness regarding the 
failure to call a potential witness (R. 354). Said motion was granted and the case 
remanded to the Third District Court on September 12, 2003 (R. 369). On December 8, 
2003, Rule 23b Remand Hearing was held after which trial court entered findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in which the Court found defense counsel were not ineffective for 
not calling the prospective witness in question, nor was Prideaux prejudiced by a defense 
counsel' s actions (R. 413 -417). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Christopher Velasquez and Vanessa Martinez started dating sometime before 
Christmas in 1999 (R. 338:278). On January 12, 2001, they lived together in an 
apartment with their five-month-old son, Anthony (R. 337:131; R. 338:277, 279). Chris 
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had learned about two weeks earlier that Vanessa, while carrying their baby, had been 
intimately involved with defendant (R. 338: 369). Chris confronted defendant at Chris's 
apartment shortly thereafter, and the two had a verbal fight, although they never hit each 
other (R. 338: 370). Chris and defendant then went into the other room and started 
drinking (R. 338:371). 
On January 12, 2001, defendant attended Chris's birthday party at Chris's 
apartment (R. 337: 134, 139, 185; R. 338: 287; R. 339:413). During the party, Chris's 
sister noticed that defendant, who "usually . . . talk[s] to everybodyf,] . . . was distant 
from everybody . . . standing in the corner by the door, just like by himself, just like 
looking" (R. 338:280). Then, twice during the party, defendant told Chris, "I have to give 
you a birthday present," although no one had brought gifts to the party (R. 339:415, 440-
41, 484). Alex Martinez, a former member of a rival gang, stated that he observed 
defendant with a gun at the party (R. 337:416-17). 
Both defendant (a/k/a Dee) and Chris (a/k/a Yogi) were members of the same 
gang, VLT (R. 337: 132, 140, 182; R. 338:281). So were many of the people who 
attended Chris's party, including Matthew Maez, Mark Martinez (a/k/a Clubhead), Joseph 
Ortega (a/k/a Ojo), Ruben Rocha (a/k/a Kid Loc), Anthony Martinez (a/k/a Loc) and 
Isaac Martinez (a/k/a Twist) (R. 337;140, 143; R. 338:382). 
In the early hours of January 13, people from a different gang showed up at Chris's 
party (R. 337:132, 186; R. 339:415, 487-88). Before long, someone from VLT told 
Rocha that one of the rival gang members had said something (R. 338: 281). In response, 
Rocha hit the rival gang member on the head (R. 338:281). When a fight broke out 
between the two gangs, a few people at the party, including both defendant and Rocha, 
pulled out their guns and started waiving them around (R. 337:133-34, 139, 198: R. 
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339:416). As the rival gang left, it opened fire on Chris's apartment (R. 337:140-41, 187; 
R. 338:282; R. 339:490). 
Almost immediately, the VLT members left Chris's home in pursuit of the rival 
gang (R. 337:141, 181; R. 338:282; R. 339:418). Matt Maez, his girlfriend Marie, 
Clubhead, and Oje left in Mart's van with Clubhead driving (R. 337:142-43, 188, 190; R. 
339:420). Defendant left with Chris and George Archuleta (a/k/a Boo Boo) in 
defendant's dark Chevy Blazer (R. 337:145, 189, 192; R. 339:419). When Alex Martinez 
(a/k/a Sapo) asked to join defendant's group, defendant told him to go with Loc and 
Twist in the last car, a white Thunderbird driven by Rocha (R. 337:191; R. 338:382; R. 
339:418). 
After about an hour hunting for the other gang, the three VLT cards met in a Food-
4-Less parking lot in West Valley City (R. 337:143, 189: R. 338:242; R. 339:421). Soon 
thereafter, the three cars pulled into and parked at the end of a cul-de-sac (R. 337:147, 
191: R. 339:442). As the cars stopped, Matt Maez bot out of the van and Boo Boo got 
out of defendant's truck to "use the bathroom" (R. 337:192-93). Alex Martinez, former 
member of a rival gang, stated that at the cul-de-sac, it was "really dark and that the 
vehicles were about 35 feet apart (R. 339:424, 435). 
Defendant also got out the truck (R. 337:151, 192; R. 339:425). Chris then got out 
with his hands up, as if he and defendant were going to fight (R. 339:425-26). Instead, 
defendant stepped back, pulled a gun, and started shooting at Chris, hitting him four times 
(R. 337:154-55, 179, 197; R. 338:350-53; R. 339:426, 428). Chris stumbled and then 
started running toward a house in the cul-de-sac (R. 337:156, 179, 196; R. 339:428). As 
he did, defendant re-entered his truck and started to drive away (R. 337:157, 196 R. 
339:429). After Matt Maez told Boo Boo to get into his van, the van and the Thunderbird 
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also left (R. 337:195-96; R. 339:429). A few minutes later, defendant met up with the 
Thunderbird at a nearby restaurant (R. 338: 266, 356). Defendant then spoke briefly with 
Rocha and gave Rocha the gun (R. 339:430). 
Chris died on the porch of a house in the cul-de-sac (R. 338:266, 356). He had no 
gun on him (R. 337:179, 204: R. 339:429, 469). 
No murder weapon was ever found (R. 338:336; R. 339:469). When defendant 
was originally detained by police, he gave a false name before finally admitting his true 
identity (R. 338:377-78). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prideaux was denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent trial counsel when 
his trial counsel elicited statements from a State witness that he was on parole at the time 
of the incident, thus providing support for his conviction for possession or use of a 
firearm by a restricted person, when the State produced no evidence that Prideaux was a 
restricted person pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503. 
Moreover, trial counsel was deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict for 
this charge because the evidence was insufficient to submit this charge to the jury. The 
only evidence establishing that Prideaux was on parole and therefore Category I restricted 
person was oral testimony from a State witness. Prideaux asserts that this evidence is 
incompetent under the Best Evidence Rule to establish proof that he was on parole, and 
thus the evidence was insufficient to submit this charge to the jury. Accordingly, trial 
counsel's performance was deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict regarding 
Count II. 
Finally, Prideaux asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 
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State to argue matters during closing not in evidence regarding his status after he was 
released from prison. This error, combined with trial counsel's ineffectiveness, was 
prejudicial to Prideaux as it is reasonably likely that he would not have been convicted of 
possessing or using a firearm by a restricted person but for these errors. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE CONSTITUTED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR ELICITING STATEMENTS 
THAT PRIDEAUX WAS ON PAROLE AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT AND 
FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT BECAUSE THE 
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A FIREARM BY A RESTRICTED PERSON 
Prideaux asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel, namely when his trial counsel elicited statements from a State 
witness that he was on parole at the time of the incident and when trial counsel failed to 
move for a directed verdict on Count II, possession or use of a firearm by a restricted 
person, because the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden 
to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984); accord State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
A. The Performance of Prideaux's Trial Counsel Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness. 
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant 
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must show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the trial.'"State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); accord State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993). 
To meet this prong, defendants "must prove specific, identified acts or omissions 
fall outside th<* wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). "[B]efore we will reverse a conviction based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of any conceivable 
tactical basis' for counsel's actions." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542 (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 
111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). 
1. There was no tactical purpose for eliciting information that Pride awe was on 
parole. 
First, Prideaux asserts that eliciting statements from a State witness during cross 
examination that he was on parole served no purpose and was not trial strategy (R. 338: 
383). The State produced no evidence that Prideaux was on probation or parole and thus 
did not establish that he was a Category I restricted person pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) and jury instruction # 26. While this Court "will not sit as a 
second fact finder" and will find the evidence sufficient if there "is any evidence, 
including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which the findings of all 
the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt," if there is no evidence 
establishing an element of the crime then this Court must reverse for insufficient 
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evidence. See State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). 
Without trial counsel eliciting this evidence from a State witness, there would have 
been no evidence introduced that Prideaux was a Category I restricted person and thus as 
a matter of law the charge for possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person should 
have been dismissed. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to move for a dismissal of Count 
II constituted a deficient performance and satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test. 
See, e.g., State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,124, 994 P.2d 1243 (trial counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in failing to make a motion to dismiss an aggravated kidnaping 
charge "when the facts [did] not support a conviction"). 
2. Trial counsel failed to move for a directed verdict or dismissal when the 
evidence was insufficient to submit the firearm charge to the jury. 
Alternatively, even though the jury heard from a witness that Prideaux had been on 
parole, this was not the best evidence and trial counsel should have moved for a directed 
verdict because there was insufficient evidence to submit this charge to the jury. Thus, 
trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a dismissal or directed verdict at the close 
of the State's case. 
In State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"[t]he best evidence of a conviction of a crime is the record of that conviction, and not by 
recollection testimony. Recollection testimony of a second witness called for the purpose 
of proving a conviction to discredit a witness is inadmissible.... When proof of a 
conviction is made by another witness, it must be established by a record of the 
judgment..." Id. at 1390. 
Following the same reasoning in Peterson, Prideaux asserts that the best evidence 
of parole status is not the testimony of a witness, but rather a record of the defendant's 
9 
parole status. Accordingly, the oral testimony regarding Prideaux's parole status was 
inadmissible. Because the State failed to produce any record of whether or not Prideaux 
was on parole, the evidence was insufficient to submit the restricted person's firearm 
charge to the jury. Thus, trial counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict as to Count 
II constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. Prideaux was Prejudiced by his Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
Without trial counsel eliciting evidence from a State witness that Prideaux was on 
parole, there would have been no evidence introduced that Prideaux was a Category I 
restricted person and thus as a matter of law the charge for possession or use of a firearm 
by a restricted person should have been dismissed. Prideaux also asserts that even with 
the testimony elicited by his counsel, the evidence was still insufficient as a matter of law 
to establish that he was on parole; and that had trial counsel moved for a directed verdict 
as to Count II, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the 
motion considering that there was insufficient evidence to submit the charge to the jury, 
as outlined above in Point I-A(2). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Prideaux asks that this Court conclude that trial counsel 
was ineffective and that but for counsel's ineffectiveness, the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction for Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by Restricted 
Person and the conviction should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2004. 
Patrick V. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, first-class mail postage pre-paid, four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney 
General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, 
this 24th day of June, 2004. 
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ADDENDA 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, MARK DOUGLAS PRIDEAUX, 
of the offense of Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted 
Person, as charged in Count II of the Information, you must find 
from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and 
every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 13th day of January, 2001, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, MARK DOUGLAS PRIDEAUX, 
possessed, used, purchased, transferred or had under his custody or 
control any firearm; 
2. While the defendant was on probation or parole for any 
felony; and 
3. That such possession or having under his custody or 
control was intentional or knowing* 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this 
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant guilty of Possession or Use of a Firearm by a 
Restricted Person as charged in Count II of the Information. If, 
on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find 
the defendant not guilty of Count II• 
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